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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - LIABILITY FOR SERVICES PERFORMED
UNDER INVALID CONTRACT-'- Plaintiff was employed by the board of overseers of defendant city to supervise obtaining employment for recipients of
welfare relief, thus relieving the city of the expense of providing for them. The
powers of the board were restricted by an ordinance which provided that before
any increase should be made in the number of subordinates, a report thereof
would be sent to the mayor for his approval. It appeared that the original -employment of the plaintiff was in violation of this provision, although the mayor
subsequently approved it up to April 5, 1936, when plaintiff's civil service appointment expired. Plaintiff continued to work until September 13, 1936, with
knowledge that his name had been removed from the payroll, but with the
assurance of the board that he would be paid and with their approval of his
_continued employment. The mayor never approved his continued employment.
Plaintiff now sues for the value of his services during the period after April 5th.
Held, the fact that the services were valuable does not impose upon the city a
duty to pay for them where the employment was not authorized by law. Cook
v. Overseers of Public Welfare in the City of Boston, (Mass. 1939) 22 N. E.
(2d) 189.
.
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RECENT DECISIONS

It is uniformly conceded that on a truly ultra vires contract there can be
no recovery against a municipal corporation, either on the contract itself or in
quasi-contract.1 The cases are in irreconcilable conflict as to whether quasicontractual recovery should be allowed where the municipality has the power
to contract, but certain statutory requirements as to form and method of contracting have not been observed. The attitude of the American courts in granting or refusing quasi-contractual recovery, as one writer points out, 2 has been
largely influenced by the decisions of the California court in Zottman v. San
Francisco,8 and Argenti v. San Francisco.4 The majority of courts follow the
theory of the Zottman case that certain requirements as to contracting are incorporated into statutes to protect the taxpayers, and therefore they are "mandatory" and must be observed. If they are not complied with, there can be no
recovery either on the contract or quasi-contractually, for to allow recovery
would be to defeat the purpose of the requirements. 5 A number of courts follow
the theory of the Argenti case, interpreting such requirements as "directory,"
and reasoning that municipal corporations are to be held liable on their contracts to the same extent as private individuals and private corporations, 6 and
such a legislative intention is to be presumed in the absence of a clear mandate to
the contrary. Under this view, though there can be no recovery on the contract
itself, still recovery will be allowed wherever possible in quasi-contract. However,
for quasi-contractual recovery to be allowed, it must be shown that the municipality has acquired a tangible benefit in the form of money, services, or materials and that it would be inequitable not to compensate the plaintiff.7 As to
what provisions are to be regarded as "mandatory" or as "directory," the courts
vary, even though the result of interpreting some of these as "directory" has
3 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 2d ed., § 1365 (1928).
Tooke, "Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations;" 47 HARV.
L. REv. 1143 at 1158 (1934).
8
20 Cal. 96 (1862).
4
16 Cal. 255 (1860). Overruled by the Zottman case, but still followed in principle by many states.
5
3 McQUILLIN, MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 2d ed., § 1283 (1928). In Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S. 247 at 257 (1876), the Court said: "it is better that
an individual should occasionally suffer from the mistakes of public officers and agents,
than to adopt a rule which, through improper combinations or collusion, might be turned
to the detriment and injury of the public." See also City and County of Denver v.
Moorman, 95 Colo. II 1, 33 P. (2d) 749 (1934); Robert G. Lassiter & Co. v.
Taylor, 99 Fla. 819, 128 So. 14 (1930); Johnson County Sav. Bank v. City of
Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N. W. 705, 237 N. W. 507 (1930); City of Lancaster
v. Miller, 58 Ohio St. 558, 51 N. E. 52 (1898).
6
First Nat. Bank of Goodhue v. Village of Goodhue, 120 Minn. 362, at 366,
139 N. W. 599 (1913), stating, "We are unable to assign a good reason for differentiating between the private and the municipal corporations as respects the rule
of justice and common honesty"; Village of Harvey v. Wilson, 78 Ill. App. 544
(1898).
1
Peterson v. City of Ionia, 152 Mich. 678, 116 N. W. 562 (1908); MemphisGaslight Co. v. City of Memphis, 93 Tenn. 612, 30 S. W. 25 (1894); Appalachian
Elec. Power Co. v. City of Huntington, 115 W. Va. 588, 177 S. E. 431 (1934).
1

2

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

been to render them meaningless.8 However, there are some states which have
formulated their public policy by statute or constitutional provision and expressly
forbid recovery in quasi-contract in certain cases.9 As has been pointed out by one
authority,1° when the early decisions were handed down and th~ delegated
powers of the municipal corporation were few, there was a stronger need for
construing such statutory restrictions as being "mandatory" in order to safeguard the taxpayer, where such statutes were the exclusive method provided by
the legislature for controlling intra vires expenditures. And even today, if by
express words or necessary construction the intent of the legislature is still
to forbid any recovery in quasi-contract, the courts are bound to follow the
legislative mandate.11 But with the increase in municipal powers there have
developed more effective means of protecting the taxpayer, such as budgetary
control of expenditures, and central supervision of indebtedness. Furthermore,
at the time the precedent-setting decisions were handed down precluding quasicontractual recovery, the taxpayer's actions to vindicate the public right were
practically unknown, and the injunctive remedy was unavailable in most instances; but today equity machinery provides effective protection. It is also
apparent that the denial of quasi-contractual recovery as a method of control
of expenditures has often led to unjust results. The dissatisfaction of the courts
with the results of the applicati9n of this construction is shown by their efforts
to preclude from the purview of the restrictive rules many classes of contracts,12
8 Statutory requirement of competitive bidding, held to be mandatory: Clinton
Construction Co. v. Clay, 34 Cal. App. 625, 168 P. 588 (1917); Flinn v. Philadelphia, 258 Pa. 355, l02 A. 24 (1917). The same, regarded as directory: O'Neill
v. City of South Omaha, 102 Neb. 836, 170 N. W. 174 (1918). Requirement of
formal appropriation before a contractual obligation can be incurred regarded as mandatory: City of Fort Pierce v. Scofield Engineering Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) 57
F. (2d) 1026; May v. Chicago, 222 Ill. 595, 78 N. E. 912 (1906). Same, regarded as
directory: Sluder v. City of San Antonio, (Tex. Comm. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d)
841; Wakelyv. St. Louis, 184 Minn. 613,240 N. W. 103 (1931).
9 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1938), § 4223, providing that certain contracts
must be let by competitive bidding and any modification thereof by resolution of the
council and written agreement by the contractor, and that "No contractor shall be
allowed to recover anything for work or material caused by any alteration or modification, unless such contract is made in such manner''; Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering,
1937), Act 5233, §§ 102-105; Missouri Constitution, art. 4, § 48.
10 Tooke, "Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations," 47 HARV.
L. REv. II43 at 1170 (1934).
11. Blumenthal v. Town of Headland, 132 Ala. 249, 31 So. 87 (1901); Reams
v. Cooley, 171 Cal. 150, 152 Pa. 293 (1915); Bristow v. Dominion Nat. Bank, 153
Va. 71, 149 S. E. 632 (1929).
12 Requirements of competitive bidding are held generally not to apply to contracts for personal services of a technical nature: Potts v. City of Utica, (C. C. A. 2d,
1936) 86 F. (2d) 616; Franklin v. Horton, 97 N. J. L. 25, 116 A. 176 (1922);
Tackett v. Middleton, (Tex. Comm. App. 1926) 280 S. W. 563. Contracts entered
into under stress of emergency in the public service, such as temporary service of street
lighting: North River Elec. L. & P. Co. v. City of New York, 48 App. Div. 14, 62
N. Y. S. 726 (1900); or contract for the removal of garbage upon the failure of the
contractor to act: Tobin v. Town Council of Sundance, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P. (2d) 666
(1933).
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and to apply as far as possible the doctrines of estoppel and ratification to prevent
injustice from being done.13 It is submitted that there is not the necessity for
denying quasi-contractual recovery today that there once was in cases where
restrictive provisions have not been complied with, and the decision in the
present case does not appear to be in accord with the present trend of allowing
recovery.14 As municipal corporations are constantly increasing their business
activities, it appears to be reasonable to hold them to the same standards of legal
liability as private corporations.

18 Tooke, "Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations," 47 HARv.
L. REv. 1143 at 1170-1171 (1934). On the subject of ratification, see 3 McQurLLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2d ed., § 1357 (1928); and 36 MrcH. L. REv. 855
(1938).
14 The trend from the strict to the lenient approach in several states is traced
in 36 MrcH. L. REV. 855 at 859 (1938). See also Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Town of
Collinsville, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 101 S. W. (2d) 583; Webb v. Wakefield, 239
Mich. 521, 215 N. W. 43 (1927); Burk v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 190 La.
504, 182 So. 656 (1938); Nebraska State Bank Liquidation Assn. v. Village of Burton,
134 Neb. 623, 279 N. W. 319 (1938).
On the general subject of municipal liability in quasi contract, see 27 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1117 (1910); 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 473 (1913); 42 A. L. R. 632 (1926);
84 A. L. R. 936 (1933); 110 A. L. R. 153 (1937); Knowlton, "The Quasi Contractual Obligation of Municipal Corporations," 9 MrcH. L. REv. 671 (1911); Weiss,
"Law or Justice? The Quasi Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations," 6 FLA.
S. B. A. L. J. 284 (1932); Tooke, "Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations," 47 HARV. L. REv. 1143 (1934).

